Abstract -This study is concerned with the problem of static parameter estimation by robust sensor fusion in the context of applications requiring, for safety reasons, a high guarantee on the reliability of the results. The integrity certification process consists of providing confidence intervals for the unknown parameter with extremely low risks of error. The concept of integrity certification is formalized for robust sensor fusion methods based on interval arithmetics, including the widely-used fault-tolerant interval functions introduced by K. Marzullo and U. Schmid. Random Boolean variables with given bounds on their a priori probabilities are first considered in the Boolean logic setting. Worst-case reasoning leads to the robust derivation of integrity bounds on logical combinations of these variables. Next, integrity bounds on the Marzullo and Schmid functions are derived from the properties of a non-connex Boolean extension of Marzullo's function.
Introduction
The present work was motivated by the increasing demand for automatisation of the traffic monitoring of transport systems. The control of many navigation systems relies on the estimation of parameters, and the safety of the parameter estimation procedures is a vital issue. The estimation algorithms must provide safe confidence intervals in which the mobile lies with an extremely low risk of error. The risk of providing misleading information is measured by a quality measure related to the safe use of the system, and called integrity. The integrity of a system measures the probability with which misleading information is issued. The International Norm Standards (e.g. the International Electrotechnical Commission IEC61508and the CENELEC EN50126standards) define Safety Integrity Levels (SIL), expressing the maximum tolerated frenquency of misleading information. In a safety context, these error rates must generally be kept very small, namely 10 −7 (SIL3) or even 10 −9 (SIL4) error per hour. This study aims at formalizing the important concept of integrity certification given by the International Norm Standards for robust interval-based sensor fusion methods, such as the fault-tolerant interval functions. Although fault-tolerant interval functions have been extensively used in mobile positioning or clock synchronization problems [1] [2] ,their integrity has yet to be proven when the majority of sensors can not be guaranteed to provide 100%-sure confidence intervals. In this paper, a safe confidence degree is allotted to each confidence interval. This modelling of the probability distributions, combining intervals and confidence degrees and mainly inspired from [3] , was adopted in other studies such as [4] .
Supposing that the frequency at which the information is ditributed is known, the process of integrity certification of a system can be done by evaluating and limiting the probability of error of each successive piece of information x. Using the traditional a posteriori approach of estimation theory [5] , the risk assessment problem could be solved by guaranteeing that the posterior probabilities P (x = true|y) are larger than some lower bound I for all observations y. Indeed, the expected reliability of x would by bounded by I :
Unfortunately, this approach generally leads to robustness issues as it requires a good knowledge of the joint probability distributions of x and y, which is seldom the case in real applications. For instance, the faulttolerant interval estimation method presented in [4] , and based on a sensor fusion method inspired from the Evidence Theory, offers no robust guarantee in terms of mean error rates. In this study, we prefer to adopt a robust 'worst-case' approach. We consider various possible working modes φ for the sensors, and make sure that the probability P (x = true|φ) is greater than I for all possible scenarios φ, or equivalently, for the mode minimizing this probability, independently from any observation. With marginalization over the modes φ, this a priori worst-case approach ensures the lower bound I on the expected reliability of x :
It should be noted that the worst-case approach involves that the performances of the method presented in this study are a priori features which do not rely on future observations and can be predicted offline. Sec. 4
shows how these features allow to derive integrity specifications for flexible control process programs robust to individual sensor failures, such as the well-known fault-tolerant functions proposed by K. Marzullo in [1] and U. Schmid in [6] . Secs. 2-3 first focus on the more general problem of certifying, using a robust worst-case approach in a strictly Boolean setting, the integrity of logical combinations of random Boolean variables with uncertain stochastic properties, when safe bounds on the a priori probabilities of the variables are assumed to be known.
Integrity of Boolean variables

Boolean variables and working modes
We consider the problem of estimation of a system subject to the observations of various sensors. The reliability of sensors, and more generally the validity of the models used for estimating the system, are represented by a set of ordered Boolean variables x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n . We suppose that the system may operate under various working conditions and failure scenarios. As a consequence, the stochastic properties of the variables can only be known with degrees of uncertainty. These modelling uncertainties are symbolized by a single parameter φ, called the mode, which models the joint uncertainties of the probability distributions of all the variables. Let Φ be the set of all the possible modes. We denote by P φ (x) the conditional probability 1 of a variable x to take the value true under a given mode φ. The conditional probabilities of a same variable may vary strongly depending on the operating mode of the system. Therefore, it is assumed that a pre-treatment is done on the data and observations to detect the obvious outliers and sensor failures, so that the mode of the system is guaranteed to belong to a subset Φ 0 of Φ, on which reliability constraints and limiting bounds on the stochastic properties of the variables are known. Adopting a robust approach, we decide to include in Φ 0 all the possible modes presenting the variables with stochastic properties adequate to the reliability constraints of the problem. Sec. 2.2 shows how these constraints can be formulated.
Integrity
The integrity of a Boolean variable x is defined as the minimum probability over Φ 0 that x is true :
Equivalently, the worst-case risk of a variable can be defined as the maximum probability over Φ 0 that the variable is false. The recent developments of S. Ferson's probability boxes [7] and A. Neumaier's fuzzy clouds [8] are a sign of the growing interest for the representation and exploitation of variables with uncertain stochastic properties. In this study, the probability of a variable under each possible mode φ of Φ 0 lies in a probability interval. Since integrity certification problems are concerned with lower probability bounds, it is assumed that the upper probability bound of a variable x is generally set to 1 and that the probability interval of x is of the form
for all φ ∈ Φ 0 . The objective of the next section is to find safe probability intervals for Boolean formulas. Boolean formulas are constructed by combining propositional variables, logical connectives (¬, ∧, ∨), and parentheses. From there, we will see in Sec. 4 how the results obtained in Sec. 2.3 in the propositional logic framework apply to interval arithmetics by allowing to derive integrity bounds on fault-tolerant interval functions.
Combining Boolean terms
The Boole-Fréchet bounds for disjunction and conjunction
The most simple Boolean formulas are the conjunction (∧) and the disjunction (∨) operators. The probability bounds of the conjunction and the disjunction of two variables with known probability intervals are given by the Boole-Fréchet bounds. These bounds were found by G. Boole in the nineteenth century, and later brought up to date by M. Fréchet [9] . Let x 1 and x 2 be two Boolean variables with respective probability bounds
As the study is mainly concerned with integrity problems, we rewrite the Boole-Fréchet bounds for probability ranges of the type (4) by setting
The worst-case bounds for the probabilities of the disjunction and conjunction of two Boolean variables x 1 and x 2 are then given by
(8) The conjunction operator helps to better identify the stochastic parameters that rule the system inside their definition spaces. A special case is when one variable is (locally) a more 'accurate' observer of those parameters than the other, in the sense that the realization of this variable implies the realization of the other. Then the conjunction has the property to select the most informative variable amongst them. An illustration of this property in the context of interval arithmetic is given in Sec. 4 , where the automatic selection of the most 'accurate' variable is the basis of the faulttolerant functions of Marzullo and Schmid.
The disjunction operator allows to reach high integrity levels by exploiting additional knowledge on the correlations between the variables. This property is discussed in the next section.
Exploitation of dependence constraints
Various ways of representing the dependence between two Boolean variables are listed in [10] . The modelling proposed in this section is adapted to the case when the probabilities of the variables are uncertain. Since the probability of the conjunction and the disjunction of two variables x 1 and x 2 are bound by the equation (9) the dependence between two Boolean variables can be completely characterized by a scalar measure [10] . We denote the worst-case risk of variable x k by
for k = 1, 2. The correlations can be modelled for instance by a function α which takes its values in [0, min(α 1 , α 2 )] and gives, for each mode φ, the risk α(φ) = P φ (¬(x 1 ∨ x 2 )) associated with the disjunction of x 1 and x 2 . We have
Given a mode φ, x 1 and x 2 are perfectly correlated
, and negatively correlated if 0 ≤ α(φ) ≤ P φ (¬x 1 )P φ (¬x 2 ). Extending the idea of making assumptions on the nature of the dependencies (maximum, minimum, nonnegative correlations or independence) [11] to problems where only lower bounds on the probabilities of the variables are known, we propose to use the information on the correlations of x 1 and x 2 to restrict the range
, and derive tighter lower bounds on the probabilities of the disjunction and conjunction :
Under the idealistic hypothesis of independent variables, the upper bounds on the risks of the disjunction given by Eq. (7) vanish from min(α 1 , α 2 ) to α 1 α 2 , which are respectively of first and second order in terms of α k . Consequently, when dealing with high integrities, that is for small values of the risks α 1 and α 2 , disjunction can lower significantly the worst-case risk of nearly-independent Boolean variables, with respect to the individual risks of these variables. On the other hand, it can be seen from Eq. (14) that the interest of bound α c is less obvious, as conjunction leads at best to the reduction of the worst-case risk by half. Therefore, in order to simplify, this works will only take Eq. (13) into consideration and count on the existence of a bound α d , which will ideally lie close to the independence value α 1 α 2 , while α c will be set to 0 by default, and now-redundant Eq. (14) will be intentionally ignored. This modelling approach of the correlations can easily be extended to more than two variables by providing lower bounds on the probabilities of n-ary disjunctions of the variables.
Integrity bounds on more complex combinations
This section briefly discusses the derivation of probability bounds on formulas more complex than simple conjunctions and disjunctions. We are in fact confronted with a probabilistic inference problem, where one must determine the logical consequences, on the probability of a given formula, of the probability constraints for the Boolean variables (and possibly for disjunctions of these variables). Safe probability bounds on a formula can be computed by repeatedly and systematically applying the Boole-Fréchet bounds (5,6) to pairs of terms. However, these bounds will generally not be the best possible bounds if the formula presents repetitions of the same variables, as in (
for instance, where all the variables are repeated twice. The loss of optimality would be due to the multiple introduction in the calculation of the uncertanties of the repeated variables [12] [13]. [10] lists various alternative strategies developed to handle formulas with repeated paramaters. These strategies include subinterval reconstitution (partition of the probability intervals in subintervals [14] ), range sampling (variant of Monte Carlo simulations), and the rule-based method, using local inference rules and illustrated in Sec. 3.3. The inference problem was formalized in [15] , and can be solved by linear programming for fixed values of the probability bounds of the integrity constraints. However, the derivation of a systematic and efficient generic solution for parametric values of the integrity bounds is an open problem which goes beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted that solutions have been proposed in the literature, e.g. in [16] . The next section proposes a predicate formula G f n as an answer to the trade-off between the properties of conjunction and disjunction. Safe integrity bounds on this formula are derived from simple inference rules.
3 The predicate function G f n
Definition
It is assumed that the Boolean variables to which the function is applied can be ordered arbitrarily and denoted x 1 , x 2 , ..., x k , ... . They become the terms of a sequence of variables (x k ) and define a corresponding sequence of sets of variables (X k ), with
be the set of all the possible combinations of f elements of X n . We call G f n (x 1 , ..., x n ), or simply G f n (X k ), the n-argument predicate defined by the disjunction of the conjunctions of the elements of all the (n−f )-combinations of its arguments :
with 0 ≤ f ≤ n − 1. Practically, G f n takes the value true iif at least n−f of its arguments are true. In other words, G f n tolerates a maximum of f false-valued arguments. The latter property is also met in the context of interval estimation by a well-known interval function proposed by Marzullo, and presented in Sec. 4.2. It should be noted that the formulation of Eq. (16) particularly stresses the similarities with Marzullo's function. The next section presents some other properties of the predicate G f n , which will allow to derive integrity bounds for G f n (X n ).
Properties
A direct consquence of definition (16) is that the predicate G f n (X n ) always gets a larger chance to be true
We have,
The structure of Eq. (16) allows the derivation of a recursive definition for the G f n function. We find, for 0 ≤ f ≤ n − 2,
Eq. (22) is obtained by separating in G f +1 n+1 (X n+1 ) the terms that contain variable x n+1 from those which do not involve x n+1 . We introduce now a second predicateG f n by considering the 'dual' formula of Eq. (16). We defineG f n (X n ) as the n-argument predicate equal to the conjunction of the disjunctions of the elements of all the (f +1)-combinations of its arguments :
with 0 ≤ f ≤ n − 1. It is interesting to note from Eqs. (16, 24 ) that the conjunctionG f n (X n ) presents n f +1 terms of arity f +1, while the G
function is a disjunction of n n−f terms of arity n−f . Definition (24) however leads to identical properties forG
Similarly, a recursive definition ofG f n can be found :
for 0 ≤ f ≤ n − 2. Again, Eq. (29) is obtained through the isolation inG f +1 n+1 (X n+1 ) of the terms containing x n+1 , while Eq. (30) is a consequence of Eq. (26) and the distributivity of conjunction over disjunction. In summary, we have
for n ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ f ≤ n − 1 . In other words, function G correspond to the n-ary conjunction and disjunction operators respectively (n ≥ 1). Dealing with n−f -ary conjunctions in Eq. (16) , and at the same time with f+1-ary disjunctions in Eq. (24), intermediate values of f (0 < f < n−1) offer an answer to the trade-off between the accuracy possibilities of the conjunction and the integrity objectives of the disjunction. Moreover, it is important to note that the predicate G f n is fully symmetric with respect to its arguments, and is not redefined according to the observations. The latter property is a necessary condition for a priori integrity certification, as explained in Sec. 1.
Integrity bounds
Eq. (24) allows to derive integrity bounds for the predicate G f n . From the equation
we subsequently derive an upper bound on the risk
and and lower bound on the probability of G f n
In the particular case of idependent variables, Eq. (35) reduces to
where factors α k are the worst-case risks of the variables taken independently :
One sees from Eq. (36) that the maximum risk associated with G f n (X n ) is of order f +1 in α k 's. This risk vanishes with increasing f , in agreement with the predictions of Eq. (17), and the target integrity level can be adjusted by selecting various values for f .
Eq. (35) can still provide useful bounds on the integrity of G f n when the Boolean variables are not perfectly independent. Consider for example the case of three correlated variables x 1 , x 2 , x 3 . It is assumed that constrainsts on the correlations of each pair of variables are known and expressed by equations of the type (13) :
where (p, q) = (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1) and α is given by
We see that Eq. (39) is an efficient bound on the integrity of G (39) are generally the bests bounds that can be found on the integrity of the predicate G f n when no other assumption is made on the stochastic properties of the variables. In the case of three variables for example, it can be shown that Eq. (39) is the largest lower bound on the probability of G
The next section does the transition from the propositional logic to interval calculus. It shows how the integrity bounds found for Boolean functions also apply to interval functions when confidence degrees are assigned to the intervals.
Confidence intervals
This section tackles the problem of estimation of an unknown real parameter θ from the observations provided by a series of sensors. The observations consist of confidence intervals, placed around the actual scalar measurements of θ collected by the sensors. In this study, an interval is said to be valid if it contains the parameter θ, while a set of intervals are compatible if their intersection is non-empty.
From Boolean variables to interval integrities
We consider n ordered intervals i 1 , ..., i n , in which the parameter θ is certified to lie with certain probabilities. The set of the n collected intervals is denoted by I n = {i 1 , ..., i n }. For k = 1, ..., n, we call a k and b k respectively the lower and upper limits of interval i k :
To each interval i k (k = 1, ..., n) we associate a Boolean variable x k expressing the validity of the interval :
Variable x k takes the value true iif the corresponding interval i k contains θ. The mode φ ∈ Φ represents the uncertainties on the statistical performance of the sensors. We suppose that the obvious sensor failures are rejected beforehand through a fault detection process, which ensures that the remaining modes φ belong to a subset Φ 0 ⊂ Φ. It is assumed that safe lower bounds on the probabilities that the parameter θ lies in the intervals are known inside Φ 0 , so that the probabilities of the Boolean variables x k are themselves bounded. These bounds are specified by equations of the form (4), with x = x k (k = 1, ..., n). Eq. (41) involves the following correspondences between the set operators (∩, ∪) on one hand, and the propositional logic operators (∧, ∨) on the other :
Tests
This section illustrates the performances of the faulttolerant functions G, M and F. The functions are tested with three independent sensors (n = 3). The sensors provide the confidence intervals i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 centered on the measurements of a same parameter θ. We assume that the following integrity constraints are given for these intervals
for k = 1, 2, 3. Since the sensors are independent, it is assumed that
where (k, l) = (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1) . The set Φ 0 is defined as the set of all the modes that verify the two integrity constraints above. Now, we will analyse a particular mode φ 1 of Φ 0 . The mode φ 1 is chosen such that the midpoints of the intervals are independent variables with same Gaussian density function f φ1 centered around θ with standard deviation σ = 1. The length of the confidence intervals is chosen constant, equal for the three sensors, and such that
for k = 1, 2, 3. For (k, l) = (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), we have,
The statistics on the fault frequencies for 10 7 simulations are depicted in Table 1 for α = 0.1 and f = 1, and compared to the upper bound 3α
2 given by Eq. (48). It can be seen that, under φ 1 , the worst-case risk is 2 −1/2α 3 ) functions. The last column of the table shows the gradation of the mean lengths of the three functions, where we considered that the length of the non-connex function G was equal to the sum of the lengths of its components. We imagine now another mode φ 2 similar to φ 1 with the difference that φ 2 retains only positive values for the measurement errors. Under φ 2 , the midpoints of the intervals are independent variables following the same probability distribution of density
Since φ 2 verifies Eqs. (56,57), φ 2 belongs to Φ 0 . This time, however, the fault orientations are perfectly correlated. The consequence of this can be observed in Table 2 : the fault rates of the three functions (3α 2 −2α 3 ) are equal, and close to the worst-case risk. This confirms the optimality of Eq. (48) in a worst-case setting. More elaborate tests covering the issue of correlated sensors and the integrity/precision trade-off will be reported in future publications.
Discussion
The integrity certification possibilities presented in this study are particularly relevant for all applications demanding high safety requirements. These applications include, inter alia, mobile positioning, railway signaling systems, automobile indicator lights, emergency shut-down systems, turbine control, or medical devices. Besides the risk assessment of interval functions, the generic character of the Boolean approach suggests other potential application fields where the inputs are not necessarily unidimensional confidence intervals on the estimated parameter. In triangularization problems for instance, the sensors do not provide confidence intervals on the mobile's position but on the distances to reference points. In particular, in the problem of GPS pseudo-range estimation from a constellation of n satellites, the function G f n leads directly to safe confidence intervals for the position (or speed) of the mobile for sufficient difference n−f . The approach presented in this study offers more flexibility than recent safe satellite positioning methods, which require the prior derivation of independent intervals on the position (or speed) by combination of subsets of satellites before the interval union or any interval function can be applied to these intervals [3] .
Conclusion
We presented in this study a novel approach to the risk assessment of robust sensor fusion methods based on fault-tolerant interval functions, in the context of applications requiring high levels of integrity. Adopting a Boolean framework, we symbolized the uncertain validity of each confidence interval by a Boolean variable. We showed how to express constraints on the confidence degrees of the intervals and on the dependencies between interval faults in terms of probability bounds on these Boolean variables. We explained how the Boole-Fréchet bounds and the theory of probabilistic inference allowed to derive safe integrity bounds on given combinations of intervals. In particular, we proposed a predicate formula G f n offering an interesting trade-off between the properties of the conjunction (gain in integrity) and disjunction (gain in accuracy) operators. The predicate G f n proved to be a non-connex version of Marzullo's fault-tolerant interval function extended to propositional logic. Moreover, the formula G f n allowed to derive safe integrity bounds for the fault-tolerant interval functions proposed by Marzullo and Schmid. The relative performances of the functions, and the relevance of the integrity bounds provided were illustrated in a numerical example.
